By R. Jankowski
Participants have little incentive to vote, collect political details or give a contribution crusade money, simply because their vote has little or no likelihood of affecting the end result of an election. Jankowski deals an evidence and facts for political participation in line with the truth that most people are weakly altruistic.
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Extra info for Altruism and Self-Interest in Democracies: Individual Participation in Government
Some have argued that the inclusion of altruistic behavior creates inconsistencies in rational choice theory (Sen, 1977). Sen argues that moral obligations (such as strong duty) entail a lexicographic ordering, which undermines von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory, and hence, expected utility analysis. Sen is correct with regard to strong duty. However, his objection does not hold for soft duty, warm glow, and altruism. , Olson, 1965). The remainder of this book will focus on the scientific testing of the altruism hypothesis, and some of its extensions.
To show that an equilibrium to the voting game must exist, we must specify the action set available to the players, the utility functions of the players, and then link them to the population uncertainty. First, I define an action set (A) for the members of the groups. I assume further that this action set is the same for all groups. Moreover, this set is finite and has at least two elements, to vote, and to abstain. Second, the utility payoff for each player is a function of three elements: the player’s type (t); the player’s action (a); and the number of other players choosing the various options (x).
This results because p1, p2, and ϕ are all less than one: p φ < p1. 2), we know: p1 p2φB1 < C. 2 Thus, the knowledge held by voters should not affect turnout if their only motivation to vote is self-interest. Voting then becomes an instrumental act, not just an expressive act. When citizens are motivated by altruism we get: p1 p2φB2 > C. 2 As ϕ increases, the incentive to vote increases. 10 If ϕ interacted only with net, self-interest (B1), the expected value of getting informed would be infinitesimally small.